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 Does a right to property exist under international law?  The traditional answer to this 
question is “no”―a right to property can only arise under the domestic law of a particular nation.  
Yet the view that property rights are exclusively governed by national law is increasingly 
obsolete.  This Article develops the thesis that the evolution of international law has reached the 
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point where a global right to property should be recognized, not merely as a moral principle but 
rather as an entitlement which all nations must honor.1   
 
 Transformative economic and political changes over the last three decades have laid the 
foundation for establishing a universal right to property.  With the end of the Cold War era, 
China, Russia, and most other socialist states have transitioned to market economies, ending their 
long-held ideological opposition to property rights.  Developing nations have increasingly 
realized that respecting property rights may both encourage needed foreign investment and help 
their citizens escape from poverty.  The protection of property rights has become an essential 
component of the globalization of trade, as reflected in a series of international and bilateral 
treaties.  Finally, today two-thirds of all nations are parties to regional human rights treaties that 
contain the right to property.  
 
 This Article explores three independent lines of analysis for recognizing a global right to 
property that binds all nations, each based on a different source of international law.2  First, the 
near-universal ratification of anti-discrimination treaties which arguably recognize the right to 
property may provide a basis for justifying the right under conventional law.  Second, because 
the domestic law of virtually every nation embraces the right to property, it should be recognized 
as a general principle of law which has universal application.  Finally, because almost all nations 
recognize the right to property under domestic law and have expressed their belief that the right 
also exists under international law, it should be viewed as customary law which all nations must 
follow. 
 
 Section I of this Article explores the unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a treaty that would 
have created a global right to property during the Cold War era and its aftermath.  Section II 
analyzes three bases for recognizing the global right today:  (a) conventional law; (b) general 
principles of law; and (c) customary law.   Finally, Section III addresses the future implications 
of recognizing the global right. 
 
I. PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 
A. Natural Law Dents in the Westphalian Model 
 
 For centuries, scholars have debated whether the right to property is created by the state 
or arises independently from it as a matter of natural law.3  The 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which 
                                                 
1 A number of scholars have analyzed the scope of the right to property that is contained in four regional human 
rights treaties. See, e.g., ALI RIZA COBAN, PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2003); THEO R.G. VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PROPERTY (2002).  Because those 
treaties do not bind all nations, they do not create a global right to property.  See infra text accompanying notes 59-
62.  This Article is the first scholarship to demonstrate that a general right to property exists under international law. 
2 It has been suggested that a specialized treaty should be adopted in order to create a global right to property.  See, 
e.g., VAN BANNING, supra note 1, at 369; Edwin D. Williamson, U.S.-E.U. Understanding on Helms-Burton: A 
Missed Opportunity to Fix International Law on Property Rights, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 293, 304-12 (1999); cf. 
Christopher K. Odinet, Towards a Convention for the International Sale of Real Property:  Challenges, 
Commonalities, and Possibilities, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 841 (2011) (arguing for a treaty covering real property 
sales).  While a treaty would be helpful in delineating the scope of the global right to property, this Article argues 
that the right already exists, contrary to the position of these commentators. 
3 See generally RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY:  THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1951).   
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ushered in the modern nation state system, signaled the victory of the positivistic approach.  
Under this view, property rights exist only to the extent that they are recognized by the law of a 
particular nation.4     
 
 A fundamental precept of international law is that each nation has sovereignty over its 
own territory.5  The logical corollary of this view is that each nation has the right to adopt its 
own laws regarding the occupancy and use of that territory by private actors, including laws 
regulating property rights.  As one authority summarized, “[a] state enjoys an exclusive right to 
regulate matters pertaining to the ownership of property of every kind which may be said to 
belong within its territory.”6   Under this approach, sovereignty and property are inextricably 
intertwined; property rights are created and defined by only national law.7  Thus, international 
law traditionally has no impact on property rights except in a few specialized situations.8  
 
 Despite the predominance of positivism, the theory that a right to property arises from 
natural law persisted.9  Thus, John Locke proclaimed that “[t]he Law of Nature stands as an 
Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others.”10  Under this view, states were formed in 
order to protect pre-existing natural rights, including the right to property.  In a sense, this natural 
law formulation may be viewed as an international right in that it superseded national law and 
was viewed as a universal standard. 
 
Inspired by Locke and other natural rights theorists, the 1776 Virginia Declaration of 
Rights proclaimed that all men possessed certain “inherent rights” which, when they “enter into a 
state of society, they cannot . . . deprive or divest their posterity,” including “the means of 
acquiring and possessing property.”11  Declarations adopted by several other American colonies 
                                                 
4 As Jeremy Bentham famously stated:  “Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and 
property ceases.”  JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69 (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1975) (1802). 
5 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 458 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter 
“OPPENHEIM”]. 
6 1 CHARLES HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 650 (2d 
rev. ed. 1947).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
402(1)(b) (1986) [hereinafter “RESTATEMENT”] (providing that a state has jurisdiction to “prescribe law with respect 
to . . . the status of . . . interests in things[] present within its territory”); E.A. Harriman, The Right of Property in 
International Law, 6 B.U. L. REV. 103, 104 (1926) (“It is a mere truism . . . to say that the legal right of property is a 
matter of local law.”). 
7 The concepts of sovereignty and property “are essentially analogous on account of the exclusiveness of enjoyment 
and disposition which is in law the main formal characteristic of both private property and territorial sovereignty.”   
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1927).   
8 The principal situations where international law affected property rights involved (a) the expropriation of property 
from foreign nationals and (b) the destruction of civilian property during wartime. Harriman, supra note 6, at 105.  
See also L. Benjamin Ederington, Property as a Natural Institution:  The Separation of Property from Sovereignty 
in International Law, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 263 (1997) (arguing that international law traditionally protected 
property rights in three situations). 
9 As Hugo Grotius explained:  “Soon after the creation of the world, and a second time after the Flood, God 
conferred upon the human race a general right over things of a lower nature . . . . In consequence, each man could at 
once take whatever he wished for his own needs, and could consume whatever was capable of being consumed.  The 
enjoyment of this universal right then served the purpose of private ownership . . . .”  2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE 
BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 186 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1625).  This “introduction of 
property ownership . . . preceded all civil law . . . .”  Id. at 295. 
10 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF  GOVERNMENT 358 (Peter Haslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698). 
11 VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. I (1776). 
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followed the Virginia model, expressly endorsing the right to property as natural law.12  
Although the later Declaration of Independence referred to the “pursuit of happiness” as an 
“unalienable right,” without specifically mentioning property,13 it seems likely that Thomas 
Jefferson intended this broader formulation to encompass the right to property.14   
 
 In turn, these American declarations influenced the development of the 1789 Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in France.15  Article 2 of the Declaration identified 
“property” as one of four “natural and imprescriptable rights of man.”16  The content of the right 
was set forth in Article 17:  “Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be 
deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and 
then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified.”17 
  
B.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
 The concept that a right to property should exist regardless of national law was reborn in 
the wake of World War II as part of the modern human rights movement.18  The culmination of 
this effort was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”),19 which 
was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948.  The use of the term “rights” in this context 
has the potential to cause confusion, because the Universal Declaration was created as a 
nonbinding instrument20 that merely set forth aspirational goals, not legally-enforceable 
obligations.  The distinction that Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein draw between “legal rights” 
and “moral rights” is helpful here.21  Under their approach, the provisions of the Universal 
Declaration would be seen as non-enforceable “moral rights.”  Because its provisions are “not 
backed by legal force . . . [they are] . . . toothless by definition[,]” imposing “moral duties on all 
mankind, not legal obligations . . . .”22      
 
                                                 
12 See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE:  MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 165-66 (1998). 
13 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1976). 
14 MAIER, supra note 12, at 134 (suggesting that Jefferson “meant to say more economically and movingly” what 
George Mason, the principal drafter of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, “stated with some awkwardness and at 
considerably greater length”). 
15 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN (Fr. 1789) [hereinafter “1789 Declaration”]. 
16 Id. art. 2.  See also DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN arts. 2, 16, 18, and 19 (Fr. 1793) 
(discussing the scope of the right to property in detail). 
17 1789 Declaration, supra note 15, at art. 17.  
18 I briefly addressed the subject matter of Sections IB, IC, and ID in John G. Sprankling, The Emergence of 
International Property Law, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 461, 465-68 (2012).  The present Article analyzes this material in 
greater depth to provide the necessary foundation for Sections II and III. 
19 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter “Universal Declaration”].  The Universal Declaration was based on an initial draft that “contained the 
first-generation political and civil rights found in British, French, and American revolutionary declarations of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries:  protections of life, liberty, and property . . . .”  OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, COMMENTARY 31 (2010). 
20 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:  SIX DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 4 (Mashood A. Baderin & 
Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds. 2010) [hereinafter “SIX DECADES”]. 
21 STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXATION 16-17 
(1999). 
22 Id. at  17. 
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 Article 17 of the Declaration acknowledged the right to property as a moral right.23   It 
provided:  “(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others[]” and “(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”  The first clause 
recognized the right to property in general terms.24  The second clause partially defined the 
content of that right by limiting the ability of any nation to interfere with private property.  While 
a nation could deprive a person of his property, it could not do so in an arbitrary manner.  This 
restriction echoes the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
 
 When the Universal Declaration was adopted, it was widely viewed as a preliminary step 
toward a binding treaty that would transform its moral rights into legal rights.25  The U.N. 
Human Rights Commission (“Commission”) later undertook two efforts to convert the right to 
property in the Universal Declaration into a binding obligation:  (1) during negotiations leading 
up to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”);26 
and (2) during a study of the issue between 1986 and 1993.  Both were unsuccessful. 
 
C. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
 During the 1950s and 1960s, drafting committees working under the aegis of the 
Commission negotiated two treaties to implement the Universal Declaration:  the ICESCR27 and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.28  But when these twin treaties were 
eventually adopted in 1966, neither contained a right to property.29  The principal roadblocks that 
led to this outcome stemmed from two sources: Cold War tensions and decolonization.   
 
First, the Soviet Union and its allies objected to the creation of a global right to property 
as a matter of ideology.30 The most intense negotiations occurred between 1951 and 1954, well 
after the post-war détente between the Soviet bloc and the West had faded.  In this atmosphere, 
Soviet negotiators tended to view Western efforts to include the right to property in the draft 
ICESCR as a threat to the integrity of the communist system.  For example, fearing foreign 
interference with its economic system, the Soviet Union suggested an amendment that would 
                                                 
23 The fact that the property provision of the Universal Declaration was located in its Article 17, just as the property 
provision of the 1789 Declaration was located in its Section 17, is presumably homage, not a coincidence. 
24 But see Martin A. Geer, Foreigners in Their Own Land:  Cultural Land and Transnational Corporations:  
Emergent International Rights and Wrongs, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 331, 372 (1998) (arguing that Article 17 does not 
recognize a “right to property”). 
25 JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND 
INTERPRETATION 15-20 (1999); SIX DECADES, supra note 20, at 11. 
26 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 998 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
“ICESCR”]. 
27 Id. 
28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
29 However, one scholar notes that this omission “can hardly be construed as rejecting the existence in principle of a 
human right to own property and not be arbitrarily deprived of it.”  Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 21 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).  It 
is noteworthy that the ICESCR does contain provisions which relate to the right to property.  Its Article 11(1) 
recognizes the right of everyone to “an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate . . 
. housing . . . .”  ICESCR, supra note 26, at art.11(1). In addition, Article 15(1)(c) recognizes the “right of everyone . 
. . [t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.”  Id. at art. 15(1)(c). 
30 VAN BANNING, supra note 1, at 44-45. 
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define the scope of the “global” right to property by the law of the nation in which the property 
existed―a position which would have eviscerated the international character of the right.31  
Ultimately, after the drafting committee was unable to reach agreement on the phrasing of the 
right to property in 1954, the committee suspended its efforts on this point and moved on to 
consider other topics.32 
 
Second, the decades following World War II brought widespread decolonization, as 
former colonies became independent nations.  This process was often accompanied by anti-
colonial rhetoric that called for the expropriation of property owned by citizens of the former 
colonial powers.  Under these conditions, new nations were often unwilling to agree to a global 
right to property because it would constrain their ability to expropriate.33  U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution 180334 illustrates this mindset.  Adopted in 1963 over the objections of 
most developed nations, it appeared to reject the pre-World War II consensus that a state which 
expropriated property owned by a foreign national was obligated to pay compensation equal to 
the fair market value of the property.  Instead, the resolution provided that a state had the right to 
expropriate such property in its national interest and was obligated to pay only “appropriate 
consideration” as defined by both “the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the 
exercise of its sovereignty” and by international law.35  Motivated by this concern, many of these 
new countries were reluctant to endorse an enforceable global right to property, either during the 
1951-54 negotiations or thereafter. 
 
D. The Valencia Rodriguez Report 
 
 Twenty years after the ICESCR was adopted, the question of a global right to property 
arose again.  In 1986, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution asking the Commission to 
“consider the means whereby and the degree to which the right to own property . . . contributes 
to the development of individual liberty and initiative . . . .”36  The preamble to the resolution 
expressed the conviction that “the right of everyone to own property alone, as well as in 
association with others, as set forth in article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,  . 
. . is of particular significance in fostering widespread enjoyment of other basic human rights . . . 
.”37  Four years later, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 45/98, which urged states “to 
provide, where they have not done so, adequate constitutional and legal provisions to protect the 
right of everyone to own property alone as well as in association with others and the right not to 
be arbitrarily deprived of one’s property.”38 
                                                 
31 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Draft Int’l Covenant on Human Rights & Measures for 
Implementation:  USSR―Amendment to the draft resolution of the United States,  U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/614 (May 4, 
1951). 
32  U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the 10th Session, Supp. 7, at 7-9, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/705 (Apr. 1954). 
33 See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 217 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that one reason the right to property was 
omitted from the ICESCR was a lack of consensus on issues relating to expropriation); VAN BANNING, supra note 1, 
at 47 (explaining that “newly independent states felt the need to establish and assert unequivocally their sovereignty 
over natural resources” through expropriation of foreign property). 
34 G. A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962).   
35 Id. at art. 4. 
36 G.A. Res. 41/132, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/132 (Dec. 4, 1986). 
37 Id. 




 The Commission selected Luis Valencia Rodriguez, a Venezuelan scholar, to conduct an 
investigation into the right to property.  In his 1993 report, Valencia Rodriguez acknowledged 
that “[t]he basic human right of the individual to own property and develop it to its full potential 
may be regarded as a human right and a fundamental freedom.”39  Yet he did not conclude that a 
binding right to property existed even in this limited form.  Rather, he observed that the right to 
property had “acquired its mandatory legal character” only to the extent that it was included in 
certain regional human rights conventions and other specialized treaties examined in the report.40  
Yet, because not all nations were parties to such agreements, he reasoned that it was not yet a 
“universal right.”41   
 
 In rejecting the concept of a universal right, Valencia Rodriguez noted that it would be 
“extremely difficult” to establish a global right to property that would be (1) incorporated into 
“the national law of all states” and (2) “capable of being given the same weight in domestic 
courts.”42   He also expressed concern that further consideration of the right to property by the 
Commission might interfere with “the effective functioning of other areas of the human rights 
system,”43 especially due to the “considerable financial constraints” which affected the 
Commission at that time.44  Ultimately, he did not recommend that the Commission take 
concrete steps to ensure that the right to property was honored at the international level, such as 
by encouraging the adoption of a multilateral treaty on the subject.  However, he did indicate 
support for developing additional regional human rights conventions that would recognize the 
right to property “similar to that established under the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the First Protocol thereto.”45  Under this approach, the costs of monitoring and enforcing the 
right to property would presumably be borne by regional human rights entities, not by the 
Commission or other U.N. bodies.   
 
 Underlying the Valencia Rodriguez study was the assumption that a binding right to 
property did not exist under international law.  Indeed, the point of his study was to ascertain 
whether it would be feasible and desirable to recognize such a right in the future, presumably 
through a multilateral treaty.   
 
II. RECOGNIZING THE GLOBAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
 
                                                 
39 Independent Expert Report, The Right of Everyone to Own Property Alone as Well as in Association with Others 
90, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993) (by Luis Valencia Rodriguez) 
[hereinafter “Valencia Rodriguez report”]. 
40 Id. at 38. 
41 Id. at 22. 
42 Id. at 90.  However, it is not clear why Valencia Rodriguez believed that an international right to property sould 
be required to satisfy these stringent criteria.  Most of the provisions of the ICESCR are not incorporated into 
national laws, but are still considered to be international law.  Similarly, while it might ultimately be desirable if the 
global right to property were enforced in domestic courts, this level of enforcement is not essential to the existence 
of the right.  Recognition of the global right will ensure that it is respected in proceedings before international 
judicial and arbitral tribunals and also employed in less formal methods of international dispute resolution, whether 
or not it is also enforced in domestic courts.  See infra text accompanying notes 191-93. 
43 Id. at 93. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
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A. Property in the Post-Cold War Era 
 
 The thesis of this Article is that a global right to property does exist, not simply as a 
matter of abstract morality but rather as a binding obligation.  The contrary conclusion in the 
Valencia Rodriguez report may well have been accurate when it was reached in 1993, given 
international conditions at that time and the limited scope of the study.  But, even assuming this 
arguendo, four factors compel re-examination of the question today. 
 
 First, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the development of new democracies, and the 
accelerating globalization of trade, international attitudes toward property rights have shifted 
dramatically.  The revised constitutions of former Soviet bloc members generally guarantee that 
their citizens have a right to property.46  Indeed, their modern economic systems are largely 
premised on the existence of private property.  When the Valencia Rodriguez report was 
prepared, this transformation was underway but not yet completed.47   
 
Second, as developing countries seek to both attract foreign investment and enhance their 
domestic economies, they increasingly understand the value of protecting property rights.  In 
recent decades, over 2,400 bilateral investment treaties have been implemented between investor 
nations and developing nations;48 these treaties routinely include provisions which protect 
against the expropriation of private property.49  The rapid expansion of the World Trade 
Organization―and particularly the enhanced protection of intellectual property rights embodied 
in the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights50―reflect 
heightened international support for the protection of property rights. 
 
 Third, the development of international law has accelerated since the Valencia Rodriguez 
study was completed.  For example, the report noted that the “degree of ratification and 
accession to universal conventions containing [the right to property] does not allow us to state 
that we are dealing with a universally recognized right.”51  But, at the same time, it stressed that 
“the level of recognition is steadily increasing, approaching universality.”52  In the last two 
decades, this trend has continued to the point where an argument can be made that the global 
right to property exists as a matter of treaty law. 
 
 Finally, because the Valencia Rodriguez study was conducted under the auspices of the 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, it examined the right to property as a human rights issue.  
Thus, while it discussed the extent to which such a right could be found in human rights treaties, 
                                                 
46 John G. Sprankling, The Right to Property in National Constitutions (Feb. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter “National Constitutions”]. 
47 The Valencia Rodriguez report acknowledged that this transformation was occurring.  See, e.g., Valencia 
Rodriguez report, supra note 39, at 21-22, 40-41. 
48 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 554 (2d ed. 2008). 
49 Id. at 584. 
50 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 




it did not explore whether the right could be viewed as a general principle of law or as customary 
international law.53        
 
It is generally-accepted that Article 38(b) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice54 sets forth the authoritative sources of international law.55  They include:  (1) 
“international conventions” or treaties; (2) the “general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations”; and (3) “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”56 





 Today the majority of the world’s nations are parties to regional human rights treaties 
which contain a right to property.  While this level of recognition is not yet universal, it must be 
stressed that a principle of international law may exist without unanimous agreement.  Indeed, 
only a handful of international law doctrines enjoy universal acceptance.   This section first 
evaluates the extent to which the human rights treaties endorse the right to property.  Because 
many nations are not parties to such a treaty, it then considers whether the right to property is 
implicit in anti-discrimination treaties that have been ratified by virtually all nations. 
 
1. Human Rights Treaties 
 
 It is remarkable that 132 nations―more than two-thirds of the 193 member states of the 
United Nations―are now parties to human rights treaties which expressly recognize a right to 
property.57  These treaties are the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
                                                 
53 The only reference to general principles of law in the Valencia Rodriguez report is found in the section on 
expropriation; it concludes that the obligation to pay compensation when a state takes property owned by a foreign 
national is required by “general principles of international law.”  Id. at 75.   Although the report states vaguely that 
the Universal Declaration set forth “universal standards which became rules of customary international law,” it does 
not identify which standards became customary law or state that the right to property was included in this group.   
Id. at 38.  Indeed, two paragraphs later the report states that the right to property “acquired its mandatory legal 
character” only to the extent that it was “included in treaties analyzed above.”  Id.  Thus, the report does not appear 
to claim that the right to property is customary international law. 
54 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(b). 
55 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (7th ed. 2008); OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 24-
25. 
56 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(b). 
57 This tabulation is based on the following.  Fifty-three nations have ratified the African Charter.  African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ratification Table, available at 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).  Twenty-three nations have ratified 
the American Convention on Human Rights. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human 
Rights, Signatories and Ratifications, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).  Eleven nations have ratified 
the Arab Charter.  Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights:  Classification and 
Status of Ratifications, 32 HUM. RTS. L.J. 197, 200 (2012).  Forty-five nations have ratified the First Protocol to the 
European Convention.  Council of Europe, Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Status, available at 
http://www.conventions.coe/int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=009&CM=8&DF=28/02/2013&CL=ENG 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2013).  
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Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”),58 the American Convention on Human Rights 
(“American Convention”),59 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African 
Charter”),60 and the Arab Charter on Human Rights (“Arab Charter”).61  Thus, a right to property 
is a reality in most of the world based on conventional law.62 
 
Despite contentious negotiations, the right to property was initially omitted from the 
European Convention when it was adopted in 1950.63  In part, this omission reflected economic 
concerns; some Western European states anticipated that the nationalization of key industries 
such as banks, railways, and utilities might be desirable.64  Another factor was the political 
tension resulting from Soviet influence over Eastern European states.65  The right to property 
was later added to the European Convention as Article 1 of Protocol 1.66  It provides, in part, that 
“[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.”67  
Although the term “possessions” might be viewed as a narrower category than “property,” the 
European Court of Human Rights has subsequently interpreted this article as protecting all types 
of property.68   
 
 Over the last three decades, the movement toward recognizing property as a human right 
has gained momentum.  In succession, the right was enshrined in the American Convention 
which entered into force in 1978 and in the African Charter which took effect in 1986.  The 
American Convention expressed the basic right in clear language:  “Everyone has the right to the 
use and enjoyment of his property.”69  The formulation adopted in the African Charter was 
equally straightforward:  “The right to property shall be guaranteed.”70  Finally, the Arab 
                                                 
58 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, protocol 1, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 
U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter “Protocol 1”]. 
59 American Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter “American 
Convention”]. 
60 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 14, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter “African 
Charter”]. 
61 Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 25, Sept. 15, 1994, reprinted in 12 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005) 
[hereinafter “Arab Charter”]. 
62 In addition, ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have (a) adopted a non-binding  
declaration which recognizes the right to property and (b) announced their intention to enter into a binding treaty 
which will include this right.  See infra text accompanying notes 72-73.  It should noted that  ten other nations, while 
not parties to any of the regional human rights conventions, are signatories to the non-binding Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe, which affirms that “every individual has the right . . . to  own property alone or in association . . . .”  
Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 193, 194.  They are:  Belarus, Canada, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrtyzstan, Macedonia, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the United States, and Uzbekistan.  Id.  Thus, in 
addition to the 132 nations that are currently members to a binding treaty recognizing the right to property, an 
additional twenty nations are parties to non-binding regional instruments that recognize the right.  
63 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter “European Convention”]. 
64 VAN BANNING, supra note 1, at 64. 
65 Id. 
66 Protocol 1, supra note 58. 
67 Id. 
68 See, e.g., Marckx v. Belgium [1979] Eur. Ct. H.R. 6833/74 at ¶ 63 (observing that “Article 1 is in substance 
guaranteeing the right to property”). 
69 American Convention, supra note 59, at art. 21(1). 
70 African Charter, supra note 60, at art. 14. 
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Charter, which entered into force in 2008, provides in part:  “Everyone has a guaranteed right to 
own private property . . . .”71 
 
Most recently, the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration,72 a nonbinding instrument that recognizes the 
right to property.  Its Article 17 echoes the right to property set forth in the Universal 
Declaration:  “Every person has the right to own, use, dispose of and give that person’s lawfully 
acquired possessions alone or in association with others.  No person shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of such property.”73  The ASEAN nations intend to develop a binding treaty that will guarantee 
the rights in this declaration, including the right to property. 
 
 In short, there is a clear trend toward including a global right to property in regional 
human rights treaties.  It is reasonable to assume that this momentum will continue in coming 
decades, as more nations become members of such treaties. 
 
 It is logical at this point to consider whether characterizing the right to property as a 
“human right” rather than simply as a “right” significantly affects its nature or content.  At one 
level, framing the right as a human right suggests that it is fundamental in nature.  As the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States explains, the term 
“human rights refers to freedoms, immunities, and benefits which, according to widely accepted 
contemporary values, every human being should enjoy in the society in which he or she lives.”74  
The implication of this view is that human rights “occupy a hierarchical superior position among 
the norms of international law,”75 and thereby prevail over other norms.  This approach applies 
neatly to human rights which are recognized as jus cogens, such as the absolute right to be free 
from genocide or torture.  But it must be questioned whether this characterization applies as 
readily to socio-economic norms, such as the right to property, which are by definition relative in 
nature.76   
 
 A related issue is whether the protection afforded by a human right to property applies 
only to natural persons or whether it extends as well to legal persons such as corporations and 
other entities.  One component of the basic definition of a “human right” is that it is a right held 
by a human being, not by an entity.  For example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration suggests 
that the instrument applies only to “human beings.”77  The scope of the nonbinding right to 
property established in Article 17, then, would seem only to protect natural persons.  However, 
most of the regional human rights treaties cover legal persons as well as natural persons.78  In 
                                                 
71 Arab Charter, supra note 61, at art. 31. 
72 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Nov. 18, 2012, reprinted in 32 HUM. RTS. L.J. 219 (2012). 
73 Id. at art. 17. 
74 RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 701 cmt. a. 
75 DE SCHUTTER, supra note 19, at 60. 
76 See infra text accompanying notes 181-84.  But see The Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 140, 141 (Mar. 29, 2006) (suggesting that the right to property 
held by indigenous people supersedes a bilateral investment treaty). 
77 Universal Declaration, supra note 19, at art. 1. 
78 See European Convention, supra note 63, at art. 25; American Convention, supra note 59, at art. 44; African 
Charter, supra note 60, at art. 55.  However, the Arab Charter is not clear on this question.  Its Article 25 guarantees 
the right to property of “every citizen,” which seemingly would include both individuals and entities.  Arab Charter, 
supra note 61, at art. 25.  On the other hand, its Article 2 undertakes to ensure that each “individual” is able to 
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addition, the right recognized by these treaties appears to extend to all forms of property, 
including family or household property and income-generating property such as businesses, 
farms and industrial facilities―not simply to the type of property which an individual would use 
in daily life.79  Accordingly, the right to property as recognized by the human rights treaties has a 
broad scope. 
 
2. Anti-Discrimination Treaties 
 
 Because many nations are not parties to the regional human rights treaties, these treaties 
are insufficient to establish a global right to property as conventional law.  Thus, it is important 
to determine whether the right to property is included in other treaties which they have ratified.  
One argument is that the global right to property is implicit in certain treaties which prohibit 
discrimination against vulnerable groups―treaties that have been ratified by almost all nations of 
the world.  Under this view, each of these treaties inherently assumes that the right to property 
exists under international law, but that discrimination at the national level prevents the particular 
group from enjoying this right on an equal basis with other citizens.  Thus, it is necessary to 
redress this imbalance by prohibiting discrimination so that the underlying global right to 
property can be realized. 
 
 For example, 187 nations80―ninety-seven percent of the world’s countries―are parties 
to the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”).81  Its Article 16 requires member states to “ensure, on a basis of equality of men 
and women: . . . (h) [t]he same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, 
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or 
for a valuable consideration.”82 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
“enjoy the rights and freedoms” specified in the Charter without discrimination; this may imply that only natural 
persons are entitled to protection.  Id. at art. 2. 
79 The American Convention and the African Charter both protect the right to “property” as a general matter, 
without imposing any limitations on the nature of the property protected.  American Convention, supra note 59, at 
art. 21(1); African Charter, supra note 60, at art. 14. See also Mouvement Ivoirien de Droits de 
l”Homme/Cote’d’Ivoire, Af. Comm’n H.P. Rts. 262/02 (May 2008) (holding that the seizure of rural land owned by 
40 companies violated the right to property in African Charter).    The Arab Charter guarantees the right to “private 
ownership,” again without any limitations on the type of property protected.  Arab Charter, supra note 61, at art. 25.  
Finally, the reference to protection of “possessions” in the European Convention extends to all forms of property.  
Protocol 1, supra note 58; COBAN, supra note 1, at 144-162 (analyzing decisions by the European Court of Human 
Rights interpreting the right to property).  In contrast, the first regional human rights instrument, the 1948 American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, covered only such property as was needed “for decent living and 
help[ed] to maintain the dignity of the individual and the home.”  American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man art. XXIII, O.A.S. Res. XXX (May 2, 1948). 
80 U.N. TREATY DATABASE, CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
WOMEN, 
 available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
81 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 
[hereinafter “CEDAW”]. 
82 Id. at art. 16(1)(h). 
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 Similarly, the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (“CERD”),83 ratified by 175 nations,84 obligates member states “to guarantee the 
right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality 
before the law, notably in the exercise of the following rights: . . . (v) [t]he right to own property 
alone as well as in association with others.”85   
 
 The right to property is also recognized in the 1990 International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (“CPRMW”),86 
which has been ratified by forty-six nations.87  It provides that “[n]o migrant worker or member 
of his or her family shall be arbitrarily deprived of property, whether owned individually or in 
association with others.”88 
 
 Most recently, the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(“CRPD”),89 ratified by 127 nations,90 requires member states to “take all appropriate and 
effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to own or inherit property  
. . . .”91   
 
 The implied recognition argument posits that CEDAW, CERD, CPRMW, and CRPD 
presuppose the existence of an underlying international right to property which is enjoyed 
generally by most people, but that discrimination  sometimes prevents women, racial minorities, 
migrant workers, and disabled persons from fully exercising this right.  As the argument goes, 
these treaties do not create a global right to property, but rather implicitly acknowledge that such 
a right exists as a matter of background law.  By prohibiting discrimination against vulnerable 
groups, the treaties allow everyone to fully enjoy this fundamental right on equal terms.   
 
 Support for the position that these treaties impliedly recognize the global right to property 
is found in resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly.  One example is Resolution 
41/132, adopted in 1986, which invited the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to “resume 
consideration of the right of everyone to own property alone as well as in association with 
others.”92  The preamble to the resolution states that “the right of everyone to own property alone 
                                                 
83 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, May 7, 1996, 660 U.N.T.S. 
195 [hereinafter “CERD”]. 
84 U.N. TREATY DATABASE, CERD, available at  
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2013). 
85 Id. at art. 5(v). 
86 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 
Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “CPRMW”]. 
87 U.N. TREATY DATABASE, CPRMW, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2013). 
88 Id. at art. 15. 
89 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, May 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “CRPD”]. 
90 U.N. Treaty Database, CRPD, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2013). 
91 CRPD, supra note 89, at art. 12(5). 
92 G.A. Res. 41/132 ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/132 (Dec. 4, 1986). 
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as well as in association with others,” as set forth in Article 17 of the Universal Declaration, was 
“reaffirmed” by Article 16 of CEDAW. This language seemingly acknowledges that the 
nonbinding right to property in the Universal Declaration was incorporated into CEDAW, a 
binding treaty, and thus imposes an obligation on all 187 member nations to respect that right.  It 
is a well-settled principle that a subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of a treaty may be taken into account in determining its meaning.93  Because 
Resolution 41/132 was approved by a vote of 109 nations to none, it might be viewed a 
subsequent agreement which interprets the meaning of CEDAW.94  Four years later, Resolution 
45/98 struck the same theme, repeating that the right to property contained in Article 17 was 
“reaffirmed” by CEDAW.95 
 
 In his 1993 report, Valencia Rodriquez implied that the global right to property was 
“incorporated in universal instruments” such as CEDAW, CERD, and CPRMW.96  Yet the report 
concluded that the degree of ratification of such treaties at that time did not justify treating the 
right to property as a “universal right.”97  Today, twenty years later, the degree of ratification is 
substantially higher.  As noted above, 187 members of the United Nations have ratified 
CEDAW―every member except Iran, Palau, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tonga, and the 
United States.  However, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Tonga, and the United States have ratified 
CERD,98 which also protects the right to property.  Only two U.N. member states―Palau and the 
newly independent nation of South Sudan―are not parties to a treaty which arguably 
incorporates the global right to property.  Thus, if the implied recognition approach is justifiable, 
it is fair to say that today the right to property is almost universally recognized in conventional 
law. 
 
 But there are several bases for questioning this approach.  First, no provision in these 
treaties expressly recognizes a general right to property.  Consistent with the principle that a 
treaty is to be interpreted “in the light of its object and purpose,”99 the dominant theme in CERD, 
CEDAW, and CRPD may simply be to protect vulnerable groups against discrimination in the 
exercise of rights that already exist under domestic law, not to impose new rights which a nation 
does not recognize.  Under this interpretation, for example, if Nation A prohibited private 
property altogether, this law would not discriminate against the vulnerable groups protected by 
these treaties because the nation would be according the same treatment to all of its nationals.  
Thus, an argument can be made that the property-related clauses in the treaties simply mean that 
(a) if a state chooses to allow property rights as a matter of domestic law, then (b) it may not 
discriminate against members of these protected groups in their enjoyment of those rights.  In 
contrast, the phrasing of the property provision in the CPRMW seems to guarantee that migrant 
                                                 
93 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(a), May 23, 1965, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter “Vienna 
Convention”]. 
94 U.N. BIBLIO. INFO. SYST., A/RES/41/132, available at 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=HB6251K582145.481285&menu=search (last visited Mar. 1, 
2013). 
95 G.A. Res. 45/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/98 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
96 Valencia Rodriquez report, supra note 39, at 13, 14, 22. 
97 Id.  
98 See U.N. TREATY DATABASE, CERD, supra note 84. 
99 Vienna Convention, supra note 93, at art. 31(1). 
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workers and their families have a right to property under international law, regardless of 
domestic law.  Yet CPRMW has not been widely ratified. 
 
 Second, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of these treaties also undercut the 
implied recognition approach.  When the meaning of a treaty is “ambiguous or obscure,” 
supplementary means such as the “circumstances of its conclusion” may be considered to help 
determine its meaning.100  CERD and CEDAW were adopted in 1966 and 1979, respectively, 
years before the collapse of the Soviet bloc.  During this era the Soviet Union and its allies 
generally continued to oppose private property rights for ideological reasons.  It is difficult to 
believe that these nations would have ratified these treaties if any reasonable argument could 
have been made that they were thereby acknowledging the existence of a global right to property.  
Even as late as 1986, forty-one nations abstained from voting on General Assembly Resolution 
41/132, which endorsed the view that CEDAW “reaffirmed” the right to property in the 
Universal Declaration.101  Yet the adoption of CRPD in 2006―long after the disintegration of 
the Soviet bloc―appears to counterbalance this point, and thus support the implied recognition 
theory.  It is significant that CRPD has been ratified by China (2008), Cuba (2007), Russia 
(2012), and twenty nations which were formerly part of the Soviet bloc (2007-12).102     
 
 A final challenge is that the relevant General Assembly resolutions may be viewed as 
internally inconsistent as to whether the global right to property exists.  As noted above, the text 
of Resolutions 41/132 and 45/98 stated that CEDAW “reaffirms” the right to property in Article 
17 of the Universal Declaration, which supports the implied recognition theory.  However, 
Resolution 45/98 simultaneously urges all nations to “provide, where they have not done so, 
adequate constitutional and legal provisions to protect the right of everyone to own property 
alone as well as in association with others and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s 
property.”103  Similarly, Resolution 43/124 calls on states to ensure that “their national 
legislation with regard to all forms of property shall preclude any impairment of the enjoyment 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .”104  These provisions might be read either as 
suggesting that (a) domestic legislation is required to create a right to property because the right 
is not recognized by international law or (b) domestic legislation is an appropriate method to 




 Conventional law provides limited support for the existence of a global right to property.  
Although the right to property is expressly recognized in the regional human rights treaties, 
about one-third of the world’s nations have not ratified them.  An argument can be made that the 
global right to property is implied in anti-discrimination conventions which have been ratified by 
                                                 
100 Id. at art. 32(a). 
101 U.N. BIBLIO. INFO. SYST., supra note 94.  It is notable that the list of abstaining nations included China, Cuba, the 
USSR, Vietnam, and nine Eastern European nations in the Soviet bloc. 
102 U.N. Treaty Database, CRPD, supra note 90.  The former Soviet bloc nations which have ratified CRPD are 
Albania, Azerbaijian, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, and the Ukraine.  
Id. 
103 G.A. Res. 45/98 art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/98 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
104 G.A. Res. 43/124 art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/124 (Dec. 8, 1988). 
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virtually every nation.  But, at a minimum, the strength of the implied recognition argument is 
unclear.  Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider whether the global right to property can be 
established through either general principles of law or customary law, both sources of 
international law which bind all nations.  
 
C. General Principles of Law 
 
 The right to property as a general matter is almost universally protected by national law.  
Ninety-five percent of the 193 states which are members of the United Nations guarantee the 
right to property,105 most commonly by language embedded in the national constitution.106  The 
right is typically contained in the section of the constitution which sets forth the “basic rights,” 
“fundamental rights,” or “human rights” which are recognized by that nation.  The near-
unanimous recognition of the right to property qualifies it as a general principle of law at the 
international level which will bind all nations―including the few that do not recognize a 
domestic right to property.107  This approach would extend the global right to nations which are 
not parties to regional human right treaties, avoiding the need to rely on the implied recognition 
theory.   However, perhaps because international tribunals have been cautious about utilizing 
general principles, to date there has been no scholarly analysis about using this approach to 
establish a global right to property.108 
 
1. General Principles as a Source of International Law 
 
 It is uniformly accepted that the “general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations” are a source of international law.109  As one scholar notes, “[t]he legal principles which 
                                                 
105 The precise scope of the right to property will presumably vary from to nation to nation, both in terms of the 
content of the right and the items which are subject to the right.  The point is that these nations do recognize the 
right to property as a general matter. 
106 National Constitutions, supra note 46.  Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe are the principal 
exceptions.  The constitutions of Cuba and North Korea contain only narrow rights to property.  The Cuban 
constitution protects personal savings from work, dwellings, other “goods and objects which serve to satisfy the 
material and cultural needs of the person,” and ownership of land by small farmers.  CONST. OF CUBA art. 19, 21.  
Similarly, the North Korean constitution covers property used “for the personal and consumption purposes of 
citizens,” which includes income from “garden plot farming . . . [and] other legal economic activities.”  CONST. OF 
NORTH KOREA art. 24.  In contrast, the constitutions of Venezuela and Zimbabwe both contain a broad right to 
property, but substantially undercut that right by allowing the expropriation of property with little or no 
compensation under certain circumstances.  CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 115, 116; CONST. OF ZIMBABWE art. 71, 72.  
See also A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES:  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999) (analyzing 
property clauses from eighty-five national constitutions).   
107 Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 701 n. 1 (noting “a willingness to conclude that prohibitions [on 
interference with human rights] common to the constitutions or laws of many states are general principles that have 
been absorbed into international law”). 
108 But see Brice M. Claggett, The Controversy Over Title III of the Helms-Burton Act:  Who Is Breaking 
International Law―The United States or the States that Have Made Themselves Co-conspirators with Cuba in its 
Unlawful Confiscations?, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 271, 289 (1997) (suggesting that it “may be possible 
to conclude that the duty of a state not to confiscate its citizens’ property without just compensation” is a general 
principle); Natalie Hevener & Steven Mosher, General Principles of Law and the U.N. Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 27 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 596, 609, 612 (1978) (arguing that Article 17(1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights codifies the general principle of the right to inviolability of the home). 
109 The modern view is that a “civilized nation” in this context simply refers to a state with a well-developed legal 
system.  All nations that are members of the United Nations are presumed to be “civilized” nations.  M. Cherif 
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find a place in all or most of the various national systems of law naturally commend themselves 
to states for application in the international legal system, as being almost necessarily inherent in 
any system within the experience of states.”110  These principles may be established through 
comparative law research.  The goal is to identify a core principle which is shared by the “major 
legal systems of the world,” even if it is not necessarily utilized by every nation.111  Once 
established, a general principle of law is binding on all nations.   
 
 Despite the predictions of some scholars that general principles of law would 
substantially expand the corpus of international law,112 tribunals have generally been reluctant to 
use them. 113 Thus, it is appropriate to consider whether the reasons for this reluctance apply to 
the right to property. 
 
 One explanation for the limited use of general principles is that international law 
traditionally regulated only interactions among state actors, where principles of domestic law had 
little relevance.114  Yet the scope of international disputes has expanded in recent decades to new 
subject areas where little or no international law exists, often involving the relationship between 
a state actor and a private actor.115  It has become necessary to utilize new sources of law in 
order to accommodate this expansion.116  Accordingly, for example, arbitral tribunals have 
increasingly utilized general principles derived from domestic contract law in resolving 
investment disputes.117   
                                                                                                                                                             
Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law,” 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 768, 768 
(1990).  
110 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 36. 
111 Wolfgang Friedman, The Uses of “General Principles” in the Development of Modern International Law, 57 
AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 284 (1963); see also H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 65 (2d ed. 1946) (noting that the 
principle must be “recognized in substance by all the main systems of law”); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal 
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 535 (1993) (noting that the principle must be shared by “the principal 
domestic legal systems”).  
112 See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 111, at 279 (noting that “[i]t is to the general principles of law . . . that we must 
increasingly turn for the building and evolution of new branches of international law, such as international 
administrative law, international criminal law, or international contract law”).   
113 1 RUDOLPH SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS:  A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 8 
(1968) (finding “virtual unanimity” among scholars that general principles have not “been a truly significant factor 
in the jurisprudence of international courts”); BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 17 (noting that the International Court of 
Justice has used general principles “sparingly”). 
114 See Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law―Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the 
New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1556 (1999). 
115 See, e.g., Lord McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 3 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 
1-4 (1957) (discussing the need for new principles to govern investment disputes between states and private 
investors).  
116 Thus, “reliance on general principles of law has played an important part in the provision of legal rules in those 
areas which . . . do not fall within the traditional scope of international law, such as . . . transactions of states 
(particularly in their dealings with private corporations) on essentially private law matters.”  OPPENHEIM, supra note 
5, at 39.  See also OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49 (1991) (noting that 
general principles of law “have been significant in allowing international law to expand into new areas of interstate 
transactions and especially into activities affecting the relations of States with non-State entities (such as business 
corporations) and with individuals”). 
117 See, e.g., John R. Crook, Applicable Law in International Arbitration:  The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 
Experience, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 278 (1989) (discussing the use of general principles of contract law in resolving 
claims before the tribunal); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at part III intro. note (observing that the 




 A second objection is that the use of general principles is inconsistent with the axiom that 
the international system is premised on state consent.118  Yet general principles, by definition, 
reflect core legal concepts which are shared by the major legal systems of the world; individual 
nations have effectively consented to these principles by adopting them into their domestic laws.  
Thus, the use of such principles cannot cause surprise or inequity, particularly in a dispute which 
falls outside of the traditional areas of international law, such as a property dispute between a 
nation and a foreign corporation. 
 
 A third concern is that allowing judges to rely on general principles would permit them to 
exercise subjective judgment unconstrained by the relatively clear limits of conventional and 
customary international law, thus becoming “a mere mask for capricious law-making by judicial 
fiat.”119  At bottom, this concern is about methodology.  Admittedly, tribunals which use general 
principles sometimes appear to assume that a particular concept is found in the domestic law of 
most or all nations, with little or no analysis of comparative law.120  But this potential problem 
has no application to the right to property which is almost universally recognized in domestic 
law, as discussed above.121 
 
 Finally, there is widespread scholarly disagreement about how specific a general 
principle of law may be.  Most authorities agree that general principles connote fundamental 
concepts, rather than technical rules.  Thus, Hersch Lauterpacht viewed them as “obvious 
maxims of jurisprudence of a general and fundamental character,”122 while Bin Cheng 
characterized them as “cardinal principles of the legal system.”123   Yet other scholars suggest 
that even a narrow rule could be viewed as a general principle of law.124  Because this Article 
advocates the recognition of the right to property in broad terms, there is no danger that it would 
create a general principle which is unduly specific. 
 
2. The Right to Property in Domestic Law 
 
 While the precise formulation of the right varies somewhat, almost every nation 
guarantees the right of natural and legal persons to own property as a general matter, without any 
                                                                                                                                                             
laws of state legal systems . . . .”); LAUTERPACHT, supra note 7, at  viii (noting that general principles of law used in 
international arbitration “are for the most part identical with generally recognized principles of private law”). 
118 Bassiouni, supra note 109, at 785-86. 
119 SCHLESINGER, supra note 113, at 11; see also Bassiouni, supra note 109, at 779.  
120 See, e.g., Crook, supra note 117. 
121 See National Constitutions, supra note 46. 
122 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 69, 74 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 
1970). 
123 The Meaning and Scope of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 38 GROTIUS 
SOCIETY TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 1952 125, 132 (1953) (discussion of Bin Cheng). 
124 SCHLESINGER, supra note 113, at 8 (suggesting that a general principle of law could be “broad or narrow”); F.A. 
Mann, Reflections on a Commercial Law of Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 20, 36 (1957) (observing that a general 
principle of law could be a “rule . . . of a technical character”). 
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limitation on the nature of that property.125  Many of these provisions echo Article 17(1) of the 
Universal Declaration, even if phrased differently.126  Sample clauses include: 
 
Angola:  Everyone shall be guaranteed the right to private property and its 
transmission under the terms of the Constitution and the law.  The state shall 
respect the property and any other rights in rem of private individuals, corporate 
bodies and local communities . . . .127 
 
Argentina:  All inhabitants of the Nation are entitled to the following rights: . . . to 
make, use and dispose of their property . . . . Property may not be violated and no 
inhabitant of the Nation can be deprived of it except by virtue of a sentence based 
on law . . . .128 
 
Azerbaijan:  Everyone has the right to own property.  No type of property shall be 
granted superiority.  Ownership rights, including the rights for private owners, are 
protected by law.129 
 
Most of these provisions go well beyond merely recognizing the right as an abstract matter and 
specifically address one or more of the following topics:  (1) the content of the right; (2) 
limitations on the state’s ability to regulate property; and (3) limitations on the state’s ability to 
deprive citizens of property.130 
 
 It is instructive to compare the overwhelming acceptance of the right to property today 
with the situation which Valencia Rodriquez described in his report two decades ago.  Rather 
than conducting independent research, he relied on states to voluntarily submit information on 
the extent to which they recognized a right to property.  Many states did not respond to the 
request for information, and diplomatic concerns presumably limited the scope of further inquiry.  
As a result, the report identified only thirty-five nations where “the basic laws and other 
legislation...recognize[] the right to own property as both a legal institution and a basic right.”131  
From this information and other sources he was able to conclude that “the majority of states have 
declared their commitment to the principle of full recognition and protection of all forms of 
property, including private property.”132    
  
 Yet today national recognition of the right to property has moved from a majority view to 
an almost universal norm.  The key to understanding this shift concerns the forty-one nations 
which abstained from voting for General Assembly Resolution 41/132 in 1986133―primarily 
                                                 
125 See National Constitutions, supra note 46. 
126 See, e.g., CONST. OF MALAWI art. 28 (“(1) Every person shall be able to acquire property alone or in association 
with others.  (2) No person shall be arbitrarily deprived of property.”). 
127 CONST. OF ANGOLA art. 37. 
128 CONSTITUTION NACIONAL [Const. Nac.] art. 14 (Arg.). 
129 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN art. 29. 
130 See National Constitutions, supra note 46; see also VAN DER WALT, supra note 106 (analyzing property clauses 
from various national constitutions). 
131 Valencia Rodriguez report, supra note 39, at 17. 
132 Id at 90. 
133 U.N. BIBLIO. INFO. SYST., supra note 94. 
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members of the Soviet block and their allies that opposed private property rights for ideological 
reasons.  Today, almost three decades later, most of these nations have amended their 
constitutions and other laws to recognize the general right to property as part of their transition to 
market economies.134  China and Russia exemplify this transition, as can be seen by comparing 
their current constitutions with those which were in place in 1986. 
 
 In 1986, the Constitution of China provided that the nation’s economic system was based 
on “socialist public ownership of the means of production . . . .”135  The constitution covered 
only the property that was necessary for a citizen’s personal use:  “The State protects the right of 
citizens to own lawful earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property.”136  In contrast, 
the 2004 Constitution accepts the role of private property in the national economy, stressing that 
the state will protect “the lawful rights and interests of the individual, private and other non-
public sectors of the economy.”137  Accordingly, it provides that “[t]he lawful private property of 
citizens is inviolable”138―without any limitation on the nature of that property.  Moreover, it 
imposes three new and distinct limitations on the power of the state to take private property.  
Such a taking must be (1) “in the public interest,” (2) “in accordance with the law,” and (3) 
compensation must be paid.139 
 
 The Russian experience is similar.  In 1986, the Constitution of the Soviet Union 
provided that the “foundation of the economic system . . . is socialist ownership of the means of 
production . . . .”140  The constitution protected only “[p]ersonal ownership of citizens,” which 
encompassed “[a]rticles of everyday use, of personal consumption and comfort, and of the 
subsidiary household, a dwelling, and savings from labor.”141  In contrast, the 2008 Constitution 
of the Russian Federation endorses the “free flow of goods, services and financial resources, 
support of competition, and the freedom of economic activity.”142  Accordingly, “private, State, 
municipal and other forms of property shall be recognized and protected on an equal basis.”143  It 
broadly provides that “[t]he right of private property shall be protected by law,”144 without 
limiting the type of property which is covered.  The same provision restricts the right of the state 
to take private property by imposing limits similar to those in the modern Constitution of China:  
(1) such a taking must be for “State requirements”; (2) it must be done “under a court order”; and 
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 It is appropriate to recognize the right to property as a general principle of law at the 
international level.  Today the right is accepted as a core concept in the domestic legal system of 
almost every nation.  Moreover, because the international legal system has expanded over time to 
regulate the relationship between state actors and non-state actors, it is necessary to enlarge the 
corpus of international law by adopting principles which are appropriate to deal with these new 
relationships.  Over fifty years ago, Lord McNair suggested that general principles of law should 
be utilized to regulate economic development agreements between nations and foreign investors, 
noting that such arrangements “often involve the creation of rights which are not purely 
contractual, but are more akin to rights of property . . . .”146  Recognition of the global right to 
property as a general principle will help to implement this vision. 
 
D. Customary Law 
 
 It is generally agreed that customary international law imposes limitations on the right of 
a state to expropriate the property of foreign nationals.147  Indeed, disputes concerning the extent 
of these limitations have generated a substantial body of international jurisprudence and 
extensive scholarly analysis.148 
 
 This section of the Article considers a broader question which has received little attention 
to date:  Does a general right to property exist as a matter of customary international law?  This 
question differs from the expropriation issue in two respects.   First, it asks whether such a right 
exists in both citizens and foreign nationals.  Second, it addresses the right as a general matter, 
not simply in the context of expropriation.  Because customary international law applies to all 
nations, this approach provides an alternative method of extending the global right to nations 
which have not ratified one of the regional human rights treaties. 
 
 The conventional wisdom is that a global right to property is not customary international 
law, as the 1987 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
(“Restatement”) illustrates.  The Reporter’s Note to Section 702 of the Restatement observes that 
the Universal Declaration includes “the right to own and not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
property.”149   However, it then explains that disagreement as to the scope and content of that 
right “weighs against the conclusion that a human right to property generally has become a 
principle of customary law.”150  But the next sentence seemingly contradicts this tentative 
conclusion; it provides that  “[a]ll states have accepted a limited core of rights to private 
property, and violation of such rights, as state policy, may already be a violation of customary 
law” (emphasis added).151  Presumably, the reference to a “limited core of rights” reflects the 
ideological tensions of the Cold War era.  Even Soviet bloc nations acknowledged that an 
individual had a right to the property necessary for personal use, such as clothes, tools, furniture, 
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and the like.152  In context, the note suggests that such a limited right might be customary law.  
But it rejects the concept that a broad right to property is customary international law. 
 
 The enigmatic language of the Reporter’s Note masks a division among the drafters of 
the Restatement.  During a preliminary meeting in 1982, a member of the drafting committee 
suggested that a general right to property should be included in the Restatement as customary 
international law.153  In the ensuing discussion, Professor Louis Henkin, the Chief Reporter, 
commented that customary international law only recognized a right to property in the context of 
the expropriation of property of foreign nationals, not a general right to property.154  Reflecting 
the international tensions of the era, he emphasized that only “those areas on which socialism 
and capitalism agree” could be designated as customary law.155  This would have extended 
protection only to such individual property as was necessary for personal use, the only category 
which was recognized by both the Soviet bloc and the West.  Ultimately, a motion to add a broad 
right to property in Section 702 as customary international law was defeated by a voice vote.156  
 
The irony in this saga is that Henkin apparently changed his mind on the issue thirteen 
years later.  During a 1995 symposium, he reportedly stated that “if he were drafting Section 702 
today he would include as customary international law [the] right[] to property . . . .”157  
However, he did not explain his rationale for this change in position.  This section of the Article 
will explain why Henkin’s 1995 conclusion was correct―a topic which scholars have not 
previously addressed. 
 
1. Custom as a Source of International Law 
 
 A principle of customary law arises when two elements are met:  (a) states generally 
adhere to a particular practice; and (b) they do so under the belief that this is required by 
international law.158  This second requirement is known as opinio juris sive necessitatis, usually 
abbreviated as opinio juris. 
 
 The first element is satisfied if a clear majority of states customarily follow the practice, 
even if it is not universally accepted.  This custom may be evidenced by sources such as 
domestic legislation, judicial decisions, and official government statements.159  Although there is 
scholarly disagreement about how widespread the practice must be, it is desirable to demonstrate 
that it “is at least representative of the ‘main forms of civilization and of the principle legal 
systems of the world.’”160  This standard reflects both methodological and prudential constraints.  
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It may be difficult to determine what the practices of 193 nations actually are. Moreover, if 
customary international law could be established only when a practice was universally accepted, 
only few such rules could be recognized because unanimous endorsement of any principle is 
rare.161 Once a principle is acknowledged to be customary international law, it is binding on all 
states, whether or not they follow the custom. 
 
 The standards that govern the opinio juris element are more complex.  As the 
International Court of Justice noted in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, this element is met 
when states “feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.”162  In some 
situations, the Court has seemingly assumed the existence of opinio juris where a widespread 
state practice has been proven.163  Yet other decisions of the Court appear to require affirmative 
evidence that states have a subjective belief that the practice is obligatory.164  This belief may be 
deduced from multilateral treaties, United Nations resolutions, and other conduct by state 
officials.165 
 
2. State Practice 
 
 The right to property easily satisfies the state practice requirement.  As discussed above, 
today almost every nation in the world recognizes the right of natural and legal persons to own 
property, either through its national constitution or domestic legislation.166 
 
 This modern uniform practice is the product of a remarkable global transformation which 
began in the late 1980s.  When Henkin and his colleagues debated whether the right to property 
could be viewed as customary law in the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union and its allies were still 
largely hostile to private property for ideological reasons.  Thus, at this time “socialism and 
capitalism” could not agree that a global right to property should exist.  Yet by 1995, when 
Henkin changed his opinion on the question, this Cold War schism had largely ended:  the Soviet 
Union had dissolved; the newly reorganized Eastern European states had embraced market 
economies; and even China was moving swiftly toward privatization.167 
 
3. Opinio Juris 
 
 The more difficult question is whether the opinio juris element is satisfied.  Because the 
state practice is almost universal, a tribunal might well utilize the less rigorous approach to the 
element and assume that the practice reflects opinio juris without the need for proof of subjective 
belief. 
 
 Under the more rigorous approach to opinio juris, a threshold question arises.  Most 
nations originally established the right to property as domestic law because it was seen as 
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advantageous, not due to a subjective belief that it was mandated by international law.  This 
process occurred long before the post-World War II era, when the international community first 
began to consider a global right to property.  In addition, the former Soviet bloc nations which 
adopted private property systems at the end of the Cold War seemingly did so because of the 
economic and social benefits which these systems provide, rather than because they believed that 
international law compelled this result.  If a state initially adopts a particular practice such as the 
right to property for domestic reasons, but later expresses its belief that the practice is required 
by international law, does the practice become customary law?  The answer to this question is 
probably “yes.”168  Regardless of why a state originally adopted the right to property, the 
subjective element should be deemed satisfied once the state expresses its belief that the global 
right is required by international law.  In this situation, the state follows the practice for dual 
reasons.  It is both (a) advantageous to the state and (b) compelled by international law. 
 
 One source of opinio juris for the right to property is found in treaty law.   In the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the International Court of Justice acknowledged that “a very 
widespread and representative” ratification of a multilateral treaty could provide evidence of 
opinio juris.169  As discussed above, about two-thirds of the world’s nations are parties to 
regional human rights treaties which expressly recognize a binding right to property under 
international law.  This fact alone should be viewed as sufficient evidence of opinio juris.  The 
almost universal ratification of anti-discrimination conventions such as CEDAW, CERD, and 
CRPD, which arguably recognize the right to property by implication, provides an independent 
basis for satisfying the opinio juris element. 
 
 As the International Court of Justice observed in Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and Against Nicaragua,170 opinio juris may also be “deduced from . . . the attitudes of . . . States 
towards certain General Assembly resolutions.”171  Some scholars have suggested that the 
entirety of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights―presumably including the right to 
property in Article 17― has evolved over time to become customary international law through 
its periodic reaffirmation by the General Assembly and other international bodies, though this 
remains a minority view.172  At a minimum, however, the consistent endorsement of the 
Universal Declaration by virtually all nations is evidence of opinio juris as to the right to 
property and its other provisions.173  As Brian Lepard summarizes, “the Universal Declaration 
and other evidence point to a belief by states that they have a strong persuasive legal obligation 
to protect all the rights it proclaims . . . .”174 
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 A third source of opinio juris is found in General Assembly resolutions which 
specifically endorse the right to property.  In 1986, Resolution 41/132 expressed the view of 109 
nations that “the right of everyone to own property alone as well as in association with others, as 
set forth in article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . . is of particular 
significance in fostering widespread enjoyment of other basic human rights.”175  It is noteworthy 
that no nations voted against this resolution, although many abstained.  Four years later, 
Resolution 45/98 both (a) repeated the theme that the right to own property contained in the 
Universal Declaration and elsewhere was important in ensuring enjoyment of human rights and 
(b) urged all states “to provide . . . adequate constitutional and legal provisions to protect the 
right of everyone to own property . . . .”176  This resolution was adopted by the General 




 The analysis above supports the view that the right to property should be recognized as 
customary international law.   Because this right is almost universally found in domestic law, the 
state practice element is easily satisfied.  It is less clear that the opinio juris element is met.  But 
both treaties and U.N. resolutions provide compelling evidence that today the vast majority of 
states accept the right as international law, even if many initially adopted the right for other 
reasons.  Accordingly, it is time to update the position taken by the Restatement, as Henkin 
belatedly advocated, by acknowledging that the right to property is customary international law. 
 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
 
A. Content of the Right 
 
 Assuming that the global right to property does exist, the next question is how to define 
the scope of that right.  In other words, if X holds a right to property which is recognized as a 
matter of international law, what is the content of that right?   
 
Any attempt to answer that question in a meaningful fashion would go well beyond the 
limited scope of this Article.  The thesis of this Article is that the global right to property does  
exist as a general matter.  Thus, it is intended as the first step in a long and incremental process 
of delineation.  Extensive work by scholars, tribunals, international organizations, and others will 
be necessary to develop and catalogue the components of the right, an endeavor which will 
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necessarily take time.   But this effort cannot begin until the existence of the right is first 
acknowledged. 
 
 With these caveats in mind, it is possible to sketch out four core aspects of the global 
right to property.  First, the right principally concerns the relationship between a natural or legal 
person, on the one hand, and a government entity, on the other hand.178  There is a well-
developed body of human rights law governing the extent to which nations are required to 
implement economic, social and cultural rights, which would logically apply to the right to 
property either directly or by analogy.179  Under this approach, the basic obligation is the duty of 
the state to respect the right to property.180  In most instances, the relevant government will be a 
national government or one of its subdivisions, such as a provincial or city government.  
However, the same principle might logically apply to the relationship between a person and an 
intergovernmental organization, such as the United Nations.    
 
 Second, the right to property is a relative right, not an absolute one.  By definition, the 
scope of the right may be affected by cultural, social, and economic factors which may evolve 
over time.181  Interpreting the right to property in absolute terms could have harmful 
consequences, such as blocking important land redistribution projects182 or impairing the 
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collection of taxes.183  Ultimately, at a minimum, the right means that no one may be arbitrarily 
deprived of her property, as Article 17 of the Universal Declaration reflects.  As it develops, the 
right will undoubtedly be broader than this core concept.  But it will remain a relative right, 
which may be counterbalanced by other societal needs.  The logical starting point for this 
analysis is Article 29 of the Universal Declaration, which provides that all human rights are 
subject to “such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just 
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”184   
 
Third, the property which is covered by the right is not limited to that which is vital for 
individual or family life, such as a home, clothing, furniture, tools, or personal bank 
accounts―as members of the former Soviet bloc had advocated―but rather encompasses all 
forms of property.  Early efforts to restrict the scope of Article 17 of the Universal Declaration to 
family property were unsuccessful.185 Accordingly, the right to property recognized in the 
regional human rights conventions extends to property in general.186  Similarly, the U.N. General 
Assembly has indicated its belief that the right to property should extend to both “[p]ersonal 
property, including the residence of one’s self and family”187 and “[e]conomically productive 
property, including property associated with agriculture, commerce and industry.”188 
 
Finally, the right should encompass both individual ownership and forms of communal or 
joint ownership.  This approach is consistent with Article 17 of the Universal Declaration which 
specifies that it includes the right to own property “in association with others.”  Although this 
clause originally stemmed from Cold War tensions, today it provides a basis for respecting 
traditional forms of customary or communal ownership which are often found in developing 
countries, where rights are held by a tribe, clan, or other group.189  The traditional Western focus 
on individual property rights need not define the global right to property.  Indeed, any such 
attempt would be counterproductive to the goal of developing an international standard.   
 
B. Practical Applications 
 
 The recognition of the global right to property would provide five types of benefits.  The 
magnitude of these benefits will increase exponentially as the contours of the right are delineated 
with more precision. 
 
 First, recognition will ensure that the right is consistently respected and enforced in 
international tribunals.  The specialized tribunals which adjudicate disputes arising under the 
regional human rights treaties, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
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184 Universal Declaration art. 29, supra note 19.  Although the preamble to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
41/132 endorses a global right to property, it appears to restrict the scope of that right by citing Article 29 of the 
Universal Declaration.  G.A. Res. 41/132 pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/132 (Dec. 4, 1986). 
185 See Valencia Rodriguez report, supra note 39, at 10. 
186 See supra text accompanying note 79. 
187 G.A. Res. 45/98 art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/98 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
188 Id.  
189 See VAN BANNING, supra note 1, at 301-07 (discussing modern forms of common property). 
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American Court of Human Rights, routinely enforce this right.190  Yet because the conventional 
wisdom is that the global right to property does not exist as binding law, it has not been 
uniformly respected in other international tribunals. 
 
 Second, a number of international instruments, ranging from treaties to contracts, provide 
that “general principles” of international law or a similar standard should be used to resolve any 
dispute which arises between the parties.191  Recognition of the right to property as international 
law will aid in interpreting the meaning of these provisions when disputes arise, whether or not 
formal litigation occurs.  In particular, consultation, conciliation, mediation, negotiation, and 
other informal methods of dispute resolution are frequently used in the international arena.192  
  
 Third, recognition of the right will contribute to building the framework for regulating 
property in the global commons―areas which by definition are outside of the sovereign 
jurisdiction of any nation such as the high seas, outer space, and Antarctica.193  As a general 
matter, it is both desirable and inevitable that a comprehensive legal regime be established to 
govern the rights and duties of nations, intergovernmental organization, and private actors in 
these regions.  It is anomalous that the right to property would be routinely honored within the 
territory of sovereign nations, as domestic laws almost universally provide, but not recognized in 
the global commons.194 The global right to property would help to fill that gap.  
 
 Fourth, the laws governing intergovernmental organizations will be clarified by 
recognition of the right.195  In this context, an intergovernmental organization is one (a) whose 
members consist of nation states and (b) which performs quasi-governmental functions.196  
Examples of such organizations range from the United Nations to the Inter-American Tropical 
Tuna Association to the International Criminal Court.  By definition, intergovernmental 
organizations are not subject to the jurisdiction of any nation.  Accordingly, the legal standards 
which govern their rights and duties are sometimes unclear.  Most commonly, these are 
established by specialized treaties.197  But recognizing the right to property as a matter of 
international law would help to fill some of the inevitable gaps and ambiguities found in such 
treaties. 
                                                 
190 See generally COBAN, supra note 1 (discussing case law); VAN BANNING, supra note 1 (same). 
191 SCHLESSINGER, supra note 113, at 12. 
192 See EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 160-171 (2d ed. 2007) 
(discussing these dispute resolution techniques in the analogous context of international environmental law). 
193 PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 14 (2d ed. 2003). 
194 Under international law, a nation has the jurisdiction to prescribe law “with respect to . . . the activities, interests, 
status, or relations of its nationals outside its territory . . . .”  RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 402(2).  Accordingly, 
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settled that a vessel on the high seas, including “things aboard,” is governed by the law of the flag state.  
OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 731.  The law governing property rights in outer space and Antarctica, for example is 
less clear.  Moreover, rather than having property rights in the global commons governed by a patchwork of national 
property regimes―which well may conflict at points―it makes sense to develop uniform international standards.  
For example, the simple extension of domestic property laws to the global commons does not provide a satisfactory 
solution when a particular item of property located there is jointly owned by citizens of different nations and the 
national laws differ. 
195 Cf. SCHLESINGER, supra note 113, at 12-13. 
196 BROWN, supra note 193, at 1093-94. 




 Finally, the evolution of the global right to property may eventually help to harmonize  
national property laws.  While variation among the property laws of different nations is 
inevitable, it may be possible to develop a global minimum standard for the right to property 
which could encourage greater uniformity in national laws over time.  Instruments such as the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works198 could provide a useful 
model.  Although the Convention establishes minimum standards for the scope of copyright 
protection that all member nations must recognize in their domestic law, any member is free to 
provide a greater level of protection.199  The certainty provided by a global minimum standard 
for property rights would encourage and facilitate international transactions.  
 
C. Potential Conflicts of Law 
 
 A final issue is whether the global right to property would conflict with domestic legal 
standards, whether found in formal laws or in customary tenure arrangements.  While it is 
foreseeable that such tensions could occur, this should not prevent the recognition of the global 
right. 
 
 As demonstrated above, the domestic law of virtually every nation already recognizes the 
right to property as a general matter, even if the specific content of the right may vary.200  Thus, 
in the short term, recognition of the global right in broad terms would be consistent with these 
domestic laws. A bigger challenge could arise in the future as the content of the right is further 
developed.  The risk of conflict will presumably increase as the scope of the global right 
becomes more specific.   
 
One potential response is to develop the right as a global minimum standard which 
consists of general principles.  As discussed above, the value of this approach is that it 
establishes a minimum floor of protection for the right, which allows a certain degree of 
international uniformity but also permits national laws to vary in some respects. The history of 
the European Court of Human Rights is instructive on this point.  Although the domestic 
property laws of its member nations differ somewhat, spanning civil law, common law, and 
former socialist law systems, the court’s property law jurisprudence has established what might 
be termed a regional minimum standard while also tolerating some national autonomy.201 
  
 Customary or informal tenure arrangements may also cause concern.  In parts of some 
nations, particularly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the formal legal system―including the 
laws establishing a right to property―has limited relevance to the lives of many ordinary people.  
Subsistence farmers in these regions often obtain an informal right to use communal land 
through customary tenure systems, while formal title to the land is vested in the government or in 
                                                 
198 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 (as 
amended at Paris, July 24, 1971). 
199 Id. art. 19. 
200 National Constitutions, supra note 46. 
201 See generally VAN BANNING, supra note 1. 
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absentee owners.202  Similarly, in developing countries most dwellings on the outskirts of large 
cities are built by squatters without permission from the landowner.   
 
Yet the risk that a global right to property would unduly interfere with these informal 
arrangements is probably more theoretical than real.  The scope of the global right should be 
broad enough to protect these land users―and perhaps more beneficial than formal domestic 
property law.  International law increasingly recognizes that indigenous and tribal peoples have a 
right to ownership of the lands that their ancestors have historically used, regardless of how 
formal title is held.203  Moreover, a growing body of international law provides that residents 
have a right to avoid being evicted from their homes and farms without good cause, even if they 
do not hold formal title.204  Finally, as noted above, the global right would protect both 




 The time has come to recognize that a right to property exists under international law.  In 
recent decades, this body of law has expanded well beyond its historic function of governing 
relations among state actors to the point where it increasingly addresses the relationships 
between states and their citizens, as evidenced by the growth of international human rights law.  
Moreover, the ideological opposition to property rights has faded away as formerly socialist 
states and developing nations have embraced free-market economies.  Just as the right to 
property is a basic principle in the domestic law of virtually every nation, it should be viewed as 
a fundamental right under international law. 
 
The evolution of the right to property under the European Convention provides a helpful 
template for development of the global right. When the right was incorporated into the 
Convention in 1954, it consisted of only three sentences.  The basic right was recognized in the 
first sentence:  “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions.”  The two ensuing sentences provided limited guidance as to the scope of the right.  
Since that time, the European Court of Human Rights has decided hundreds of cases which have 
defined the scope of that right.205  In addition, the writings of many scholars have assisted in this 
process.  The right to property under the European Convention is now so thoroughly developed 
that entire books have been devoted to the topic.206 
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 The content of the global right to property will undoubtedly be the subject of extensive 
debate in future decades.  It is inevitable that future study will identify and delineate the core 
concepts which are encompassed within the right, dealing with topics such as the acquisition and 
transfer of property among private actors207 and the ability of the state to regulate or seize 
property.  Conventional law may be helpful to some extent in developing these core concepts.  
Indeed, it might be possible to craft a universally-accepted treaty which provides a blueprint for 
the scope of the right.208  But the more promising tools for this purpose are general principles of 
law and customary international law, supplemented by decisions of judicial and arbitral tribunals 
and the writings of scholars. Ultimately, the result will be a cohesive and coherent body of 
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